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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact on agricultural price incentives of the main adjustment 
programmes implemented by the Sudanese government during the period 1978-1993, 
notably the Economic Recovery Programme (ECRP) 1978-1985 and the national economic 
Salvation programme (NESP), 1990-93. 
The study addresses two basic questions: Did these programmes provide any tangible 
incentives to agriculture? And are improved price incentives an efficient and sufficient 
condition for increasing aggregate agricultural output? 
The effects of the programmes on the level and stability of price incentives were 
measured, both at the sectoral (direct) and economywide (indirect) levels. The results 
indicate that both programmes failed to improve either the level or the stability of real 
farm prices. Poor macroeconomic policies appear to be the main cause. 
With regard to the efficacy of price incentives in stimulating aggregate agricultural 
output, the findings tend to confirm the predominant view that increases in real farm 
prices have positive but limited overall effect on agriculture. Non-price factors appear to 
play a greater role in determining aggregate agricultural output. The analysis implies that 
without the provision of adequate credit, public investments and improvement in 
infrastructure, the aggregate response of agriculture to price incentives would be minimal. 
I. Introduction 
Domestic policy in Sudan, as in many developing countries, has discriminated against 
agriculture and exports. The agricultural sector over the period 1980-1990, and on all 
counts, showed poor performance, which was attributed to both domestic and external 
factors. In an attempt to improve the performance of agriculture a number of stabilization 
and structural adjustment programmes were implemented during the period 1980-1993. 
The current economic programme, the national economic salvation programme 
(NESP), initiated in 1990, appreciating the fact that Sudan's agriculture has been heavily 
taxed and discriminated against, attempted to remove this bias. Like its predecessors, 
the economic recovery programme (ECRP) 1978-1985 and the four-year economic 
salvation programme (ESP) 1987-1989, the NESP sought the attainment of a balance of 
payments and a higher rate of investment and economic growth. Its main target was to 
promote agricultural production through a combination of reforms of the production 
systems and price incentives and the liberalization of farm prices and foreign trade. 
The performance of agriculture under these programmes varied considerably. In terms 
of overall growth in agricultural output, the NESP is superior. But this should not be 
interpreted to mean that the NESP succeeded in promoting agricultural growth and that 
other programmes failed. The performance may vary considerably depending on factors 
such as the magnitude of the economic crisis that preceded each programme; the extent 
to which the government actually implemented and sustained the adjustment reforms; 
and the effect of exogenous factors, such as weather, civil war and changes in the terms 
of trade facing the country. 
Stabilization, structural adjustment and agriculture in 
Sudan 
In a study of Sudanese agriculture, Acharya (1979) found that the industrial and trade 
policy framework in 1970-1975 imposed sizeable implicit and explicit taxes on agricultural 
crops and harboured an overall incentive bias in favour of industry. On the basis of data 
for the period 1970-1980, Sudan was classified as a highly inward-oriented country with 
substantial bias against agriculture and exports (World Bank, 1987). This biased system 
of protection led to the over-valuation of the Sudanese pound, discriminating further 
against exportable goods, most of which are agricultural products. 
The economic recovery programme (ECRP) was introduced in 1978 with the main 
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purpose of reforming the pattern of incentives both within agriculture and between 
agriculture and industry. The ECRP, implemented by the government then in power, 
was supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Its major 
targets were to adopt a more realistic exchange rate, reduce quantitative restrictions and 
remove export taxes. Several domestic measures were also taken to complement the 
trade reforms in order to promote exports. 
Assessments of the ECRP in Sudan differ widely according to the methodology and 
evaluation used, but there is almost unanimous agreement that the ECRP failed to attain 
its objectives (Awad, 1983; Hussein and Thirlwall 1984; Ali, 1985; Umbadda and 
Shaaeldin, 1985; Brown, 1986; Hag Elamin, 1990). Disagreement exists over the causes 
of this failure. Critics of liberalization policies doubt the efficacy of the adopted policy 
reforms in Sudan in promoting agriculture, particularly devaluation (Hussein and 
Thirlwall, 1984; Ali, 1985). The IMF and the World Bank relate the failure to poor 
implementation and weak government commitment (World Bank, 1985). Others claim 
that exogenous factors were the main cause. Internal policy weaknesses, deteriorating 
terms of trade facing the country, weather and environmental hazards, and civil war that 
coincided with the implementation of the programme, all appear to have contributed to 
the poor performance of agriculture and exports over the period 1970-1990. The most 
devastating was the escalating civil war in the southern part of the country. 
The actual cause seems likely to combine elements of all these factors, so that the 
impact of the adopted policies on agriculture thus remains unclear. Further investigation 
and analysis are necessary to help resolve the issues. 
The NESP was introduced in 1990 with the objective of rectifying the shortcomings 
of previous stabilization and adjustment programmes. Whether it succeeds or not is still 
a question open for discussion and empirical investigation. The critical consideration in 
assessing its impact on agricultural production is its effectiveness in improving incentives 
for farmers. 
Aims and approach of the study 
The common feature of the adjustment programmes in Sudan is their heavy emphasis on 
the importance of reforming the pattern of incentives in agriculture. In order to assess 
such programmes it is necessary, therefore, to answer the following two basic questions: 
• Did the programme provide any tangible price incentives to farmers? 
• Are improved price incentives an efficient and sufficient condition for improving 
agricultural performance in an economy such as Sudan's? 
Evidence on the positive response of agriculture to price changes in developing 
countries is accumulating. Empirical studies on Sudan have shown mixed results, but 
generally there is consensus that individual crops are reasonably responsive to prices.1 
Disagreement exists on whether aggregate output responds positively to price changes, 
and whether the low supply elasticities justify emphasis on price policies. Notwithstanding 
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these different perspectives, there is agreement on the importance of incentives, both 
price aiul non-price, as the main instrument required to promote agricultural production 
and exports. The question remains as to whether the stabilization and structural 
adjustments have actually created the required price incentives and whether these price 
incentives were supported by the appropriate non-price policies to bring about the required 
changes in the agricultural sector. 
The ICR! 3 and NESP differ considerably in terms of programme design, government 
commitment, magnitude of policy changes, and external influences. Thus one would 
expect the two programmes to have created different effects on agriculture based on 
their impact on price and non-price incentives. Comparing the two programmes may 
help, therefore, in understanding the major problems constraining the sustainability and 
implementation of adjustment reforms in Sudan, and whether these problems are related 
lo weaknesses in implementation, exogenous factors or the inadequacy of the prior 
policies. 
This study attempts to measure and compare the impact on agricultural price incentives 
of the two main stabilization and structural adjustment programmes implemented over 
the period 1978-1993. These two programmes are the economic recovery programme 
(HCRP) 1978-1985, and the national economic salvation programme (NESP) 1990-1993. 
The comparison of the two programmes gives more valuable insights than would be 
obtained from studying one or the other. In analysing farm price incentives, the study 
attempts to distinguish programme effects (policy-induced effects) from non-programme 
effects (exogenous effects). The effects of exogenous factors are best examined in a 
counterfactual analysis, i.e., what would agricultural incentives have been like in the 
absence of the adjustment programmes? Given the difficulty of establishing the 
counterfactual case, this study concentrates on the assessment of the level of policy-
induced effects, with some attempt at assessing effects of a major exogenous factor, 
terms of trade. Within the policy-induced effects, a further distinction is made between 
the effects resulting from sectoral policies and those resulting from economy-wide policies. 
This distinction is important given that the two programmes differed in the content and 
sequence of each of these type of policies. Although the two programmes pursued more 
or less the same kind of policies, NESP seemed to place greater emphasis on sectoral 
policies than did ECRP. 
The comparison of the ECRP and the NESP may be criticized because the latter is 
still ongoing and its impact on agriculture may not yet be fully visible. This problem is 
actually less acute because the study is largely concerned with the comparison of the two 
programmes in terms of their effects on agricultural incentives rather than on agricultural 
output. In addition, four years have elapsed since the start of the NESP in 1990, and this 
period is sufficient to assess effects on incentives. 
Recognizing that the success of any policy to promote agricultural performance 
depends critically on how agricultural producers respond to price changes, the study, by 
improving data quality and econometric tests, examines the supply response of aggregate 
agricultural output to changes in both price and non-price incentives. 
The study proceeds as follows: Section II describes the main policy measures adopted 
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by the ECRP and NESP and the overall performance of agriculture in each programme. 
In Section III the effects of these programmes on the level and stability of agricultural 
price incentives are measured and compared. Section IV examines the response of 
agricultural output to changes in price and non-price incentives, and Section V presents 
conclusions and policy implications. 
II. Agricultural sector performance and 
policies 
Structure of the agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector plays a pivotal role in Sudan's economy. It contributes, on average, 
about 36% of the country's GDP, over 90% of export proceeds and 75% of the productive 
sectors' value added, and employs 70% of the labour force. In addition, it produces over 
90% of the national food requirements. Most of the productive capacity of the country 
depends heavily on agriculture as a source of raw materials, wage goods, foreign exchange 
earnings, and markets for goods and services produced by other sectors. Therefore, the 
productivity and efficiency of agriculture are central to any programme for economic 
recovery. 
The agricultural sector comprises five main sub-sectors: irrigated; mechanized rainfed; 
traditional rainfed; livestock; and forestry. Out of Sudan's total area of approximately 
200 million feddans (1 feddan = 0.42 hectares) of cultivable land, only about 25 million 
to 30 million feddans are currently under crop. The irrigated crop subsector contributes, 
on average, about 27% of the agricultural GDP. It produces over 95% of Sudan's cotton, 
most horticultural products, all the wheat and almost half of the groundnuts. Sorghum 
production in irrigated areas is deliberately kept low, for only subsistence purposes, as it 
is assumed to be produced more economically in rainfed areas. All major irrigated 
agricultural schemes are publicly owned, and are operated in collaboration with tenants. 
The crop mix, input use and variety selection are controlled by the government. The 
major public agricultural schemes include Gezira, Rahad, New Haifa and Suki. Each 
scheme has a typical farm size that varies between 10 and 40 feddans. For instance, in 
the Gezira scheme, the biggest agricultural scheme in Sudan, the standard tenancy size 
is 40 feddans. 
Mechanized rainfed farming covers about 9 million feddans. Farms are privately 
owned and operated. This subsector is characterized by large farm size, with typical 
holdings of 1,000 and 1,500 feddans. Principal crops are sorghum and sesame, with 
sunflower and short-staple cotton assuming increasing importance. The traditional rainfed 
crop subsector covers about 11 million feddans. Farm size in traditional agriculture 
varies considerably, but holdings are generally small (fewer than 10 feddans). The 
important crops grown are sorghum, groundnut, sesame, gum arabic and millet. Farms 
are privately owned and operated. 
The livestock subsector contributes about 35% of agricultural GDP and 15% of 
agricultural export products. It absorbs about 0.5 million members of the labour force. 
The animal population is estimated at about 60 million head. 2 
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Economic reform programmes 
During the late 1970s Sudan's economy began to experience severe interdependent 
structural problems that inhibited economic growth (World Bank, 1985). The internal 
sector has long suffered from excess aggregate demand resulting in inflationary pressures 
in the economy. This is further aggravated by the devastating effects of the civil war in 
the south and frequent incidence of drought. In the external sector there has been a 
continuous deficit in the balance of payments and accumulation of external debts. 
To address these issues, the government has launched a series of development plans 
and programmes. These include the five-year plan (1972-1977), the economic recovery 
programme (ECRP - 1978-1985), the four-year economic salvation programme (1987-
1989), the national economic salvation programme (NESP -1990-1993) and more recently 
the ten-year national comprehensive development strategy (1992-2002). All these plans 
and programmes were either adjusted or terminated due to either their failure or a change 
of government. The programmes that had a better chance of implementation were the 
ECRP and the NESP. The remaining part of this section describes the performance of 
the economy under each of these two programmes. 
ECRP policies and performance (1978-1985) 
The main economy-wide policy action taken by the government during the ECRP was 
the devaluation of the Sudanese pound followed by attempts to adopt tighter demand-
management policies. The potential effects of these policies, however, were undermined 
by rising inflationary pressures. During 1978/79-1984/85 the official exchange rate was 
devalued, on average, by 14.5% per annum, whereas the domestic inflation over the 
same period grew by 27% per annum. 
A series of sector-specific policies were implemented in agriculture, the most important 
of which were the introduction of the individual account (IA) system of production 
relations in the Gezira scheme; general rehabilitation of the major public agricultural 
schemes; reduction of export taxes for agricultural exports; and the dismantling of the 
monopoly power of the Oilseeds Company in oilseeds exports. In 1981 the joint account 
(JA) system of production relations in the Gezira scheme was replaced by the individual 
account (IA) system. Accordingly, each tenant paid fixed land and water charges that 
varied from one crop to another depending on the cost and the amount of water used. 
The disincentive effects of the JA system were partly removed, since under the new 
arrangement the tenant's incremental income was not shared with the government. 
Another important characteristic of the IA was that costs of production were charged per 
unit area (feddan), rather than per unit output as was the case in the JA, thus providing 
incentive for increasing yield. This movement represented the initial step in the 
privatization of the public irrigated schemes in Sudan. 
Despite the government effort of introducing changes in the areas of exchange rate, 
pricing policies, export taxes, production relations and public investment, a host of other 
policy variables were left untouched. The irrigated sector continued to be controlled by 
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the Agricultural Public Corporations (APCs). The government continued to decide the 
crop rotation, varieties to be grown and input quantities, and to control farm-gate prices 
of cotton, wheat and gum arabic. The APCs also continued to recover land and water 
charges of all crops from cotton proceeds simply because cotton marketing was controlled 
by the government, while the marketing of other crops was managed by the tenants, a 
factor that made cotton a relatively less profitable crop. 
Marketing of principal exports like cotton, gum arabic and oil seeds was monopolized 
by the government through its public marketing parastatals. Although these export 
marketing parastatals were described by various government reports as less than efficient, 
little was done to change their marketing policy. They failed to stabilize producer prices 
and reduce seasonal price variations. Furthermore, they dampened incentives for 
producers by keeping agricultural prices at very low levels compared with international 
prices. 
Formal credit to agriculture was confined principally to the Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan (ABS), and rural financial markets in Sudan were dominated by informal lenders. 
The ABS credit was channelled mainly to a limited number of large-scale farmers who 
could provide guarantees. The ABS was unable to recover enough of its loaned funds, 
and experienced several additional problems including high administrative costs, interest 
rates fixed at negative real values, capital erosion, poor coordination and inadequate 
supply of loanable funds. The other source of formal credit to agriculture was the Bank 
of Sudan. It provided loans to the APCs, which were in most cases regarded by farmer 
unions as a subsidy from government. This resulted in accumulation of debts against 
APCs, a factor that contributed significantly to the inefficiencies of APCs. The commercial 
banks' credit to agriculture was negligible since they concentrated on financing industry 
and foreign trade. 
The economy in general and agriculture in particular were crippled by a series of 
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures such as import licensing, registration of exporters, 
reporting of stocks and restrictions of crop movements. These administrative interventions 
greatly discouraged production and exports. Moreover, domestic policies were unstable, 
which was clearly manifested in the pricing and marketing of agricultural products. 
Abolishing and then reinstating government monopolies in oilseeds is one example of 
the changes in government policies that created a discouraging environment for production 
and exporting. 
These policy changes were not the only variables that affected agriculture. A host of 
exogenous negative shocks coincided with the implementation of the adjustment policies 
in 1978-1985. Most notable were the civil war, the spread of droughts and famines, and 
the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries. The drought effect was more 
devastating to rainfed crop production and livestock (Teklu etal, 1991). 
Performance of the economy 
The basic macroeconomic indicators during the ECRP period are presented in Table 1. 
As can be seen from the table there was a heavy variability in the real GDP during 1978-
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1985 with an annual average growth rate of -0.3%. Given the population growth of 
2.9% a year, the poor performance of GDP implies a decline in real per capita GDP. The 
agricultural GDP was even worse. The poor performance of agriculture originated mainly 
from the decline in productivity especially in the irrigated sector due to the deterioration 
of irrigation infrastructure, worn out capital and the disincentive effects brought about 
by the application of the joint account system of production relations in the public irrigated 
schemes before 1980/81. 
Agriculture recorded an exceptional growth rate of 32% in 1981/82, which was 
believed to be the result of the implementation of the agricultural rehabilitation programme 
and the replacement of the joint account system by the individual account system (World 
Bank, 1985). During the period 1982/83-1984/85, however, both GDP and agriculture 
recorded negative growth rates. This was attributed to the severe drought at that time. 
The country's balance of payments deteriorated significantly during 1978/79-1984/ 
85. Exports were declining with heavy annual fluctuations. Imports increased steadily 
from US$1,116 million in 1978/79 to US$1,754 million in 1981/82 and then declined to 
US$1,178 million in 1984/85 as a consequence of restrictive measures adopted by the 
government. The trade gap was partially covered by increasing receipts of remittances3 
and commodity aid, but there was still substantial deficit in the current account. 
Table 1: Macroeconoroic Indicators during ECRP (1978/79-1984/85) 
78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 
GDP value (S£ million)* 
constant 1981/82 price 5396 5589 5671 6237 6264 6084 5806 
Agricultural GDP (S£ million) 
constant 1981/82 price 2030 1897 1814 2369 2214 2159 1651 
GDP growth rate -10.0 3.6 1.5 10.0 0.4 -2.9 12.8 
Agricultural GDP 
growth rate -17.0 -6.6 -4.4 32.0 -7.6 -2.5 -23.6 
Exports (US$ million) 527 594 538 439 568 721 549 
Imports (US$ million) -1116 -1339 -1540 -1754 -1543 -1370 -1178 
As % of GDP 
-Agriculture 37.6 33.9 32.0 38.0 35.3 35.0 28.4 
-Investment 13.2 15.1 15.3 19.0 17.4 16.5 16.2 
-Revenue 9.0 11.0 13.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 
-Expenditure 15.0 17.0 25.0 22.0 19.0 18.0 23.0 
-Budget deficit 6.0 5.0 12.0 6.0 5.0 8.0 12.0 
Money supply 
(S£ million) " 1825 2543 2975 4421 
Inflation rate 13.4 21.5 28.2 45.5 
(19..=100) 
Sources: 1) World Bank (1990). 
2) Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1993). 
*S£ = Sudanese pounds 
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Up to 1982/83 Sudan was able to compensate for the poor export performance by 
external borrowing and assistance. By the late 1980s, however, access to external 
financing was severely curtailed and Sudan failed to meet its debt service obligations. 
Despite several Paris Club scheduling arrangements, Sudan's external debt began to 
mount. In 1984 the total outstanding external debt was about US$6 billion; the arrears 
were US$1.5 billion in 1985, with a debt service ratio of about 30%. 
The fiscal performance of the economy for 1978/79-1984/85 was weak. The share of 
total revenue to GDP remained stagnant with an annual average rate of 12%, while the 
share of government expenditure to GDP increased from 15% in 1978/79 to 23% in 
1984/85, mainly due to the increasing costs of the civil war in the southern part of the 
country. The poor fiscal performance resulted in large budgetary deficits. External 
finance and use of foreign aid counterpart funds covered about 60% of the overall deficit, 
leading to more dependence on foreign aid. There was a considerable increase in money 
supply, with the annual rate of monetary expansion reaching about 40% during 1981/82-
1984/85. The average inflation rate for the same period was 27%. 
The performance of agriculture 
The performance of agriculture shows a sharp contrast between irrigated and rainfed 
subsectors (Table 2). While both production and yield levels improved in the irrigated 
subsector they declined significantly in the rainfed subsector, thus overall agricultural 
performance remained stagnant. Despite the slight improvement in yield in the irrigated 
sector, yield levels in both subsectors were very low compared with proved potential and 
the attainable levels in countries with similar resource potential. Furthermore, production 
and yield were more stable in the irrigated subsector than in the rainfed subsector, which 
is more vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall. 
Table 2: Production and yield indexes 1978/79-1984/85 
78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 
Production* 
-Irrigated 72 81 58 75 77 83 98 
-Rainfed 110 77 108 146 80 78 41 
Yield* 
-Irrigated 87 77 85 116 107 110 117 
-Rainfed 89 86 104 106 81 74 60 
*A weighted average for various crops is used. 
Source: Calculations based ori data obtained from the Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan. 
Several factors contributed to the poor performance of agriculture in 1978-1985. Most 
important of these was the domestic policy bias against agriculture. The over-valued 
exchange rate, production taxes, state monopolies, inadequate credit and the heavy 
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regulatory environment all contributed to the poor performance of agriculture. In addition, 
the sector continued to face severe structural and technological constraints. 
The government allocated substantial resources to the agricultural sector in 1978-
1985, amounting on average to about 28% of public investment. The bulk of this 
investment was directed to the irrigated sector as part of the agricultural rehabilitation 
programme. The rainfed subsector, despite its significant contribution to the national 
economy, received only a small share of public investment. 
NESP policies and performance (1990-1993) 
The programmes prior to 1989 allowed only for partial adjustment measures rather than 
a comprehensive policy reforms. These partial adjustments led to increased inflation, 
under-utilization of capacity and stagnation in economic growth. As a result, Sudan 
became heavily dependent on commodity aid and external foreign assistance. In an 
attempt to reverse the economic decline and stimulate economic growth, the government 
embarked on a medium-term three-year economic programme referred to as the national 
economic salvation programme (NESP) 1990-1993. 
Objectives of the NESP 
The NESP aimed to reallocate available resources in favour of the production sectors, 
particularly agriculture, with the following objectives: 
• Concentrating on agricultural production to achieve self-sufficiency, food security 
and social equity. 
• Liberalizing the economy, deregulating price controls and removing administrative 
and legal barriers in order to stimulate agricultural exports to generate more foreign 
exchange. 
• Enhancing the role of the private sector and privatizing state-owned enterprises. 
• Achieving financial and social stability. 
The programme declared that the vulnerable segments of the society would be given 
special consideration, through social welfare programmes, to alleviate adverse effects of 
the adjustment process. 
NESP policy package 
The policy measures adopted to achieve these objectives can be broadly categorized as: 
• Economy-wide policies: 
Unifying the foreign exchange rate and freeing the circulation and use of foreign 
exchange by commercial banks, firms and individuals. 
Lifting price controls and regulations to allow market forces to interact. 
Abolishing minimum export prices and licensing systems and lifting import 
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restrictions. 
Adopting more restrictive fiscal and monetary policies (efforts in this regard 
were not successful due to the increasing government spending on the civil 
war). 
• Agriculture sector-specific policies: 
Removing subsidies on goods and services provided by the APCs, most 
important of which are fertilizers, insecticides, land and water. 
Significantly reducing subsidies on food products. 
Lifting price controls and regulations imposed by the government on agricultural 
commodities; the exception is wheat, where government intervention is 
maintained by determining the minimum procurement price. 
Abolishing the monopoly of public marketing parastatals: the Oil Seeds 
Company, Livestock Marketing Corporation and Cotton Company. 
Reducing export taxes to 5% for all exports except cotton and gum arabic, for 
which export tax was reduced to 10% 
Shifting APCs financing to a consortium of commercial banks and retaining 
credit ceilings for agriculture at higher proportion, where 50% of total credit 
was devoted to agriculture. The banking services were also expanded through 
the establishment of new specialized banks and expansion of the services of 
the existing ones. A major change in agricultural finance was the adoption of 
Islamic forms of lending (Murabaha and Salam), 
Rigorously revising the 1990 Investment Encouragement Act to include more 
concessions and privileges to attract national and foreign investment. 
Reforming government administrative structures to cope with liberalization 
policies and enhance the role of the private sector. 
The overall performance of the economy 
The performance of the macroeconomic indicators during the NESP period are 
summarized in Table 3. The GDP growth rate increased from 1.2% in 1990/91 to 11.3% 
in 1991/92, and reached its highest level of 13.1% in 1992/93. The average annual 
growth rate over the three years was 8.5%. This improvement in GDP performance was 
attributed mainly to the significant recovery in agriculture, as its growth rate rose from 
-4% in 1990/91 to 31% in 1991/92 and 27% in 1992/93. Other sectors of the economy 
remained stagnant. 
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Table 3: Macroeconomic indicators 1990/91-1992/93 
90/91 91/92 92/93 
GDP value (S£ million) 6691.00 7447.00 8473.00 
constant 1981/82 prices 
Agricultural GDP (S£ million) 1918.00 2522.00 3206.00 
constant 1981/82 price 
GDP growth rate 1.20 11.30 13.10 
Agricultural GDP growth rate -4.20 31.50 27.00 
Exports (US$ million) 343.00 347.00 385.00 
Imports (US$ million) -1486.00 -1268.00 -1005.00 
As % of GDP 
- Agriculture 28.70 34.00 38.00 
- Investment 15.10 17.20 25.60 
- Revenue 8.00 8.00 11.00 
- Expenditure 10.00 15.00 17.00 
- Budget deficit 2.00 7.00 6.00 
Money supply (S£ million) 31645.00 51497.00 132998.00 
Inflation rate 114.00 106.00 112.00 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1993). 
The balance of payments position was not encouraging, as export performance was 
declining and foreign debts were mounting. During the period 1990-1993 the value of 
exports stagnated at an annual average of about US$360 million. This was too low 
compared with US$500 million average for the 1980s. The current account deficit was 
US$1.9 billion in 1990/91 and US$1.2 billion in 1992/93, while the trade account deficit 
was US$1.14 billion in 1990/91, US$0.94 billion in 1991/92 and an estimated US$0.62 
billion in 1992/93. The net capital inflow recorded a continuous decline as foreign aid 
fell sharply, reaching its lowest level of US$101 million in 1992/93. Sudan's outstanding 
debts reached about US$15.0 million in 1992/93, with the arrears estimated at US$8.4 
billion. The debt service ratio in 1989 was about 118%. 
In terms of fiscal performance, the ratio of domestic revenue to GDP was about 8% in 
1990-1992, but rose to 11% in 1993. There was a considerable improvement in the 
contribution of tax revenue, which rose from 122% in 1991/92 to 214% in 1992/93. The 
total expenditure as a share of GDP increased from 10% in 1990/91 to about 17% in 
1992/93. Despite this improvement, the budget deficit remained high and was mainly 
financed internally by central bank borrowing with no or little external finance. 
Money supply during the NESP increased fourfold, from (Sudanese pounds) S£31.6 
billion in 1990/91 to S£51.5 billion in 1991/92 and an estimated S£133 billion at the end 
of the programme. The money supply grew at an average annual rate of 83%. This led 
to a high level of inflation, estimated at 114% in 1990/91,106% in 1991/92 and 112% in 
1992/93. 
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Agricultural policies and performance 
The policy reforms assigned agriculture its leading role as the engine of economic growth. 
These policy changes were taken as an active initiative towards a change in strategy 
rather than a temporary adjustment to internal and external shocks. 
The nominal exchange rate of the Sudanese pound per U.S. dollar was devalued from 
the official rate of S£4.5/US$1.0 in 1991 to 90 in February 1992 and 140 in May 1993. 
Recognizing the adverse effects of liberating the foreign exchange rate on the prices of 
imported inputs, the government adopted a preferential exchange rate (between the official 
and market exchange rates) for the import of essential inputs. Substantial improvements 
were achieved in the area of pricing of products, where the role of the Ministry of 
Commerce in controlling prices was frozen and ministerial committees were set up to 
oversee a set of flexible induced prices. 
To reinforce the role of the private sector the government launched a phased programme 
for privatization and liquidation of public sector enterprises. Some of the APCs were 
liquidated, e.g., Nuba Mountain Corporation and Livestock and Meat Marketing 
Corporation, while several others were identified as targets for privatization. As for the 
major irrigated APCs (Gezira, Rahad and New Haifa), their boards of directors were 
reconstituted with farmers given 50% of the seats to enhance their role in decisions 
affecting their well-being. Staffing of parastatals was reduced by 30%-40% following 
restructuring so as to emphasize commercialization. Plans are underway to privatize 
ginneries and agricultural machinery services, offering farmers the key role in any 
privatization plan. 
The agricultural sector showed significant growth in 1990/91-1992/93, with rates 
outpacing those of the economy as a whole. This resulted from the increase in both area 
and yield (Table 4). The production and yield indexes based on 1986/87-1988/89 seasons 
(Table 4) indicate substantial increases in production, particularly in the irrigated sub-
sector. Food crops recorded a higher growth rate than export crops. This is largely 
attributed to the food security action deemed necessary by the government. 
Table 4: Production and yield indexes 1990/91-1992/93 (1986/87-1988/89=100) 
90/91 91/92 92/93 
Production* 
- irrigated 119 164 123 
- rainfed 25 91 119 
Yield* 
- irrigated 92 175 157 
- rainfed 78 104 97 
Source: Calculations based on data obtained from the Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan. 
*A weighted average for the major crops is used. 
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Similarities and differences between ECRP and NESP 
Before discussing the areas of differences between the two programmes, it is important 
to mention their common features. The types of policy measures adopted by the two 
programmes are largely similar, as both aimed to reduce the budget deficit and control 
the money supply in order to restore macroeconomic balance, and to restore or create 
incentives to produce tradeable goods (exports and import substitutes). The main policy 
components include devaluation of the exchange rate, removal of subsidies on food and 
energy products, trade reforms, and increased emphasis on the promotion of agriculture 
and exports. (See Table 5). 
While the two programmes pursued more or less similar price policies, they differ in 
various key areas: 
First, the ECRP was perceived as an adjustment programme to correct structural 
imbalances resulting from both internal and external factors. The NESP, on the other 
hand, was seen as a step towards a change in strategy rather than a temporary adjustment 
to unfavourable events. Thus, the first three years of the NESP were immediately followed 
by the launch of the ten-year national comprehensive strategy (1993-2002). The NESP 
calls for outward orientation, but at the same time advocates self-reliance especially in 
food. These two targets were seen to be largely conflicting and difficult to compromise 
(Hassan, 1991). 
Second, the NESP receives greater attention and commitment from the government 
than did the ECRP. Government commitment to the programme and popular support for 
its implementation are crucial for the success of an adjustment programme (World Bank, 
1985; FAO, 1991). Government commitment does not necessarily result in better 
implementation, however. Track records of the two programmes show that while the 
implementation of the proposed reforms in ECRP were uneven and characterized by 
delays, most NESP reforms were too hasty and lacked proper sequence and coordination. 
Third, the NESP witnessed sudden drastic policy changes, while the ECRP appears 
to have introduced changes at a lesser speed and magnitude. Fourth, NESP gave greater 
attention to the non-price determinants of agricultural production, particularly agricultural 
credit and institutional reforms. It is now well known that adequate funding is a key 
determinant of the success of reforms. Inadequate funding was among the reasons for 
policy failures in a number of sub-Saharan countries (FAO, 1991). The NESP extended 
a substantial amount of credit to farmers. This credit extension was largely financed 
from non-real resources, which tends to hurt farmers indirectly through increased inflation. 
In addition, the profit margin o: f the newly introduced forms of credit is very high compared 
with the extremely low interest lending previously provided by the Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan (ABS)_ There is a controversy on the appropriate profit margins to be charged, 
but many observers believe t hat the adopted profit margins are so excessively high that 
they may adversely affect farmers' profitability. In spite of this, the new forms received 
wider acceptability by farmers and provide higher returns than non-agricultural loans 
(Elhiraika, 1996). The non-price policies of the NESP also include several actions to 
remove institutional barriers. The government dissolved a number of marketing boards, 
parastatals and public agricultural corporations. 
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Table 5: Summary of similarities and differences between ECRP and NESP 
ECRP NESP 
Donor support 
Government commitment 
Speed of policy implementation 
Privatization 
Liberalization of prices 
The exchange rate 
Rate of devaluation 
Monetary expansion 
Inflation rate 
Public investment in agriculture 
Non-price policy including 
Agricultural credit 
Agricultural exports 
Annual average 
Net capital inflow 
Food security 
High 
Moderate 
Slow 
Slow and low commitment 
Moderate 
Multiple 
From S£0.3/US$ to 
S£2.5/US$ in 1985 
60%/annum 
27%/annum 
The leading sector 
Less dominant 
US$550 million 
High 
Low commitment 
Low 
High 
High 
High commitment 
Highly liberalized 
Unified for most of period 
From S£12/US$ 
in May 1993 
130%/annum 
112%/annum 
The leading sector 
More dominant 
US$350 million 
Low 
High commitment 
Table 6: Dates of devaluations of Sudanese pound 
Period Official exchange 
rate (£S/US$) 
ECRP 
Jun 1978 0.4 
Sep 1979 0.5 
Nov 1981 0.9 
Feb 1982 1.3 
Feb 1985 2.5 
NESP 
Nov 1990 4.5 
May 1991 12.2 
Oct 1991 15.0 
Feb 1992 90.0 
Jul 1992 112.0 
Nov 1992 135.0 
Jun 1993 145.0 
Aug 1993 164.0 
Sep 1993 172.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan (various years) Annual Report. 
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Fifth, external donor support for the ECRP was pronounced, particularly from the 
multilateral sources, the World Bank and IMF (Brown, 1986). The NESP, on the other 
hand, has received almost no donor support. Moreover, world prices of Sudan's major 
export crops have witnessed a relatively high rate of deterioration during the NESP period. 
During the ECRP period the foreign support was not only confined to financing the 
deficit of the balance of payments; it was also extended to bridge the overall budget 
deficit through extra revenue collected from sales of the aid programme commodities. 
This has disappeared during the NESP period. 
Sixth, as indicated earlier, macroeconomic policies were more unstable and poorly 
implemented during the NESP. The increasing spending related to the civil war in the 
south and the acute shortage of foreign exchange contributed significantly to resultant 
poor macroeconomic policies. 
Finally, there is some degree of difference between the two programmes in terms of 
timing of adjustment. Timing of adjustment, especially devaluation, is an important 
issue for agriculture. The ultimate effect of devaluation, for example, depends on whether 
it raises input or output prices first. Most of Sudan's agricultural commodities are annual 
summer crops grown in the June-July period and harvested and sold in October-January. 
These crops include sorghum, sesame, millet, gum arabic and groundnut, which together 
account for more than 65% of total value of agricultural output. Any change in the 
exchange rate in the period after December and before July the next year will raise input 
(fuel, fertilizer, seeds, etc.) prices long before the higher prices on output are received. 
Such devaluation can prevent output growth or force cutbacks. 
As shown in Table 6, the two programmes do not seem to have been successful in 
terms of the timing of exchange rate changes, although the NESP is relatively better. 
Seven out of the 14 devaluations during the two programmes were undertaken at times 
when farmers would first be faced by an increase in their production costs. 
With such policy changes and reforms it is difficult to judge a priori which programme 
would be more likely to succeed in removing distortions and improving incentives for 
agriculture. Although the NESP policy package looks more comprehensive (Table 5), 
with sound sectoral and institutional reforms, its deficient macroeconomic policies make 
it difficult to judge how overall price incentives would look. 
Ill Measurement of agricultural price 
incentives 
The stabilization and structural adjustment measures of the reform programmes in Sudan 
arc sufficiently varied, and the responses to them sufficiently complex, that no single 
analytical scheme can hope to encompass them. In comparing the two programmes 
(HCRP and NESP) the idea is to measure the effects of each programme on the level and 
stability of agricultural price incentives. The level of price incentives is analysed by 
identifying direct effects resulting from sector-specific policies and indirect effects 
resulting from economy-wide policies, as well as exogenous effects that stem mainly 
from international terms-of-trade movements. Sectoral policies include policies such as 
land and output taxes, marketing duties, and export taxes. The economy-wide (trade, 
exchange rate and macroeconomic policies) policies affect farm real prices indirectly 
ill rough movements of the real exchange rate. Economy-wide policies appear to represent 
a dominant source of bias against agriculture and exports in developing countries (Krueger 
ct al,. 1988). Empirical findings for Sudan tend to support this evidence (Hag Elamin, 
1990; Elbadawi, 1993). The measurement of stability in price incentives, on the other 
hand, is meant to examine the impact of policy changes on the variability of farm-gate 
prices and incomes. 
Level of price incentives 
Direct and indirect price incentives were estimated using the following simple 
decomposition of real farm-gate price: 
P/P = (PJE,) (P\/P1 (EP7P) (1) 
Where: 
Pfi = farm-gate price of product i 
P = aggregate domestic price 
E. = official exchange rate applicable to product i 
P*bj = border equivalent price of product i in foreign currency (adjusted for 
transportation and marketing costs) 
P* = aggregate international price 
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P f i/P is a measure of real farm-gate price of product i (R f i); Pn/E.P*bi is the nominal 
direct protection coefficient of product i (NPC d i) 6; P*bi/P* is the international terms of 
trade for product i (TOT.); and EP7P is a measure of the real exchange rate facing 
product i (RER.). All these variables are expressed as indexes relative to a base year. 
Equation 1 can therefore be rewritten as: 
Rfr NPCd,TOT,RER. (2) 
The direct nominal protection coefficient (NPC d) measures the direct effect on farm 
prices resulting from sectoral policies. The term TOT., international terms of trade for 
agriculture, reflects the effect of movement in terms of trade on farm real prices. The 
measure of the real exchange rate (RER), on the other hand, reflects the indirect effect 
on real farm prices resulting from economy-wide policies. The RER. as indicated in 
Equation 1 follows from Bautista (1987). Where E. is defined as the price of one unit of 
the reporting country's currency in terms of foreign currency expressed as an index number 
relative to the base year. Actual calculations use the exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. 
dollar. P* and P are also expressed as indexes of the same base year. Thus, an increase in 
the real exchange rate index relative to the base year shows depreciation of the exchange 
rate, while a decrease in the index implies appreciation. This index has therefore been 
used as an approximate measure of real appreciation or depreciation of the currency. 
The aggregates of NPC d, RER and ATOT for agriculture are specified as: 
NPCd = IwNPCdi = Ew.(Pf/EFbi) (3) 
RER = IwRER. = Zw.(EiPVP) (4) 
ATOT = IwTOT. = Ew/P'JP') (5) 
Where w.is the share of product i in the value of total agricultural output, with total 
sum of w. equal to one. 
On the basis of the above definitions, and assuming that terms-of-trade movement is 
the only exogeneous factor that affects real farm prices, the above decomposition of 
aggregate farm real prices for agriculture can be rearranged and defined as follows: 
NPCd = EwNPCd. (direct price incentives) (6) 
NPCp = NPCd RER (direct and indirect incentive or policy-induced 
incentives) (7) 
NPCt = NPCd RER ATOT (total price incentives) (8) 
These coefficients could be expressed as rates as follows: 
NRPd = NPCd-l 
NRPp = NPCp-l 
NRP"t = NPC-1 
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NRP d can be interpreted as the rate of the equivalent tariff (tax or subsidy) that would 
yield the given domestic price. NRP d is thus an ex post measure of the price gap resulting 
from market price altering measures that directly affect producer and border prices of the 
commodity. As such, it measures the effect of direct (sectoral) policies. Positive NRP d 
indicates subsidization, i.e., the domestic price of the commodity exceeds its border 
price equivalent, while negative NRP d indicates taxation. This information, however, 
does not say anything about the protection of the commodity relative to other sectors in 
the economy, nor does it tell which among the sectoral policies are responsible for the 
protection level found. Because of the limitations associated with the measurement of 
NRP d (see, for example, Grubel and Johnson, 1971; Westlake, 1986), it is much better 
suited to measure the attempt at removing distortions than to measure the size of these 
distortions (Scandizzo, 1989). NRP d is therefore used to assess the effects of sectoral 
policy changes that were adopted as part of the adjustment policies in Sudan. 
NRP p, on the other hand, measures the effect of both sectoral and economy-wide 
policies; as such it accounts for the policy effects on farm incentives, and is therefore 
referred to as "policy-induced incentives". NRP ( measures the aggregate effects on farm 
incentives resulting from policy variables as well as term-of-trade movements. 
Farm price incentives at the three levels (NRPd, NRP p and NRP) were estimated for 
Sudan's agriculture using data for the period 1970-1993. In calculating these measures, 
the year 1970 is used as the base year, i.e., the year in which relative prices were assumed 
to be at equilibrium. In 1970, the balance of payments and the trade balance stood at 
S£5.9 million and S£9.6 million, respectively, which are fairly close to equilibrium. At 
the same time, the average inflation for 1970 was at a comparable rate to world inflation 
(6% domestic inflation compared with 4% world inflation). Then, aggregate weighted 
indicators, based on the shares of individual crops in agricultural GDP, were estimated. 
General pattern of agricultural price incentives 
Price incentives for agriculture were assessed by calculating NRP d, NRP p and NRP t for 
both the major agricultural crops and the aggregate agricultural output for the period 
1970-1993. The major crops considered are cotton, groundnut, sesame, gum arabic, 
sorghum, millet and wheat. Paucity of data prevents the inclusion of livestock and forestry 
products. 
Results of the analysis show that agricultural producers were, on aggregate, taxed 
throughout the period 1970-1993 (Table 7). The NRP d for agriculture, except in 1985 
and 1988-1991, was consistently negative, indicating that the prices paid to producers 
were less than border equivalents. Adjustment for RER substantially increased taxation 
for agriculture. Comparing NRP d and NRP p results indicates that indirect taxes (resulting 
from economy-wide policies) were greater than direct taxes most of the time. This result 
supports the findings of Elbadawi (1993), although the magnitude of indirect taxes is 
less pronounced here. 
This taxation was significantly reduced by the continuous improvement in terms of 
trade over the period 1970-1985, but nonetheless left agriculture with negative levels of 
overall protection except in 1985. Between 1986 and 1993, however, terms of trade 
added a substantial amount to the total taxation of agriculture. 
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Table 7: Average price incentives for agricultural producers due to direct and indirect 
policy measures and terms of trade 
Aggregate agriculture: 
NRPd NRP^ NRP, 
Years Direct price Direct and indirect Total (direct, 
effect price effects indirect and terms-of-
trade effects) 
% % % 
1970-78 -40 -50 -47 
1979-85 (ECRP) -14.5 -27 -30 
1990-93 (NESP) 01 -44 -73 
Cereals: 
1970-78 -41 -51 -51 
1979-85 (ECRP) -8.1 -11.9 -37 
1990-93 (NESP) 14 -37 -75 
Non-cereals: 
1970-78 -41 -50 -42 
1979-85 (ECRP) -36 -46 -25 
1990-93 (NESP) -32 -62. -76 
Source: Extracted from tables A4, A5 and A6 in Appendix A. 
While non-cereal crop producers were subjected to both direct and indirect taxation 
throughout the period, cereal crops growers received some positive nominal protection 
in 1983-1985, 1988-1989 and 1990-1991. This positive protection is not fully policy-
induced, however. It is largely the result of the sharp increase in domestic prices of 
cereals during periods of food shortages that result mainly from climatic hazards. 
Comparison between ECRP and NESP 
In comparing ECRP and NESP in terms of their effects on agricultural price incentives, 
the following points are worth noting: 
1. The NRP d for aggregate agriculture improved significantly during the NESP period, 
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as it increased from -16% in 1978-1985 to 1% in 1990-1993 (Table 7). Given that 
domestic prices of cereals substantially increased following the 1984/85 and 1990/ 
91 crop failures, when their exports were banned, one should not rely on the level of 
overall price incentives (for agriculture as a whole). The major cereal crops (sorghum 
and millet) are produced mainly for domestic consumption and are occasionally 
exported. During periods of shortages the government bans their export and as a 
result their domestic prices, which become a function of domestic demand changes, 
exceed their international equivalent prices. 
When decomposing agriculture into cereal and non-cereal crops, it appears that 
direct price incentives for cereals increased substantially while those for non-cereals 
increased only slightly. Thus, NESP seems to have produced only little improvement 
in direct price incentives (from -38% to -32%). 
It is estimated that 70% of Sudan's agricultural output consists of exportables, 
12% of importables and 18% of non-tradeables. These shares fluctuate heavily over 
time, however. During periods of drought and crop failure, for example, most of the 
exportable food crops, especially sorghum, tend to become import substitutes. This 
shift increases the prices of these food crops, moving them closer to their import 
substitutes. The price of sorghum, for instance, approximates and sometimes exceeds 
that of wheat during periods of shortages. The shift of a crop such as sorghum, the 
main staple food in Sudan, from the exportable category to the import competing 
category increased the share of the latter to more than 50%. Therefore, during years 
of drought, cereal crops and agriculture as a whole appear protected. 
2 When comparing the policy- induced (direct and indirect) effect of the two 
programmes, NESP does not seem to have created any improvements. On the contrary, 
total direct and indirect price incentives (NRP ) deteriorated significantly. The NRP 
fell from -29% during the ECRP to -44% during NESP. Thus, although the NRP d for 
cereals, non-cereals and agriculture as a whole showed some improvement during 
the NESP, NRP p deteriorated significantly during the same period, indicating that 
the bias resulting from poor economy-wide policies more than offset the positive 
effect of the sector-specific policies. Although the NESP appears to have taken 
more active steps towards liberalization of farm prices compared with the ECRP, the 
resultant price incentives seem to have been worse than under the ECRP. 
3. The international terms-of-trade movement aggravated the bias against agriculture 
more during the NESP than during ECRP. Terms of trade increased the aggregate 
agricultural taxation rate from -44% to -73% during the NESP, and from -29% to 
-32% during the ECRP. 
International terms of trade for agriculture (ATOT) did not decline during 1970-
1978, in fact they improved at an average rate of 3% per annum. This improvement 
could simply be related to the rapid increase in international prices of cotton, sesame 
and gum arabic (the major exports of Sudan). During the ECRP period (1979-1985) 
there was no clear deterioration in ATOT. In 1990-1993, however, the ATOT declined 
at an annual rate of 32%. With the exception of gum arabic, all of Sudan's tradeable 
crops witnessed a decline in their international prices from 1990-1993 levels. 
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These results suggest that neither of the adjustment programmes adopted in Sudan 
(ECRP and NESP) created clear improvement in price incentives for agriculture, although 
the ECRP appears to have been marginally better. However, during the implementation 
of these programmes, the agricultural sector faced several shocks due to hazardous climate, 
deteriorating international terms of trade and the civil war, which all acted to offset 
policy efforts to improve incentives. The effect of the climatic shocks was to increase 
food prices (cereals) and dampen real prices for exportable crops. The civil war (the war 
in southern Sudan) effect is very difficult to identify but it can simply be read from the 
rising budget deficit since 1983, and its consequent inflationary impact. 
In an attempt to remove the effect of exogenous factors, NRP d and NRP^ were 
calculated again after excluding years of drought, namely, 1984-1985, and 1990.5 The 
results show that while price incentives for non-cereal crops improved, price incentives 
for cereals and agriculture as a whole decreased substantially. The adjusted results also 
show that the impact of NESP was less than that of ECRP. 
Instability in agricultural price incentives 
Level of instability 
The foregoing analysis presents estimates of the level of real farm price incentives. Price 
incentives to which farmers react, however, are not only a function of the level of farm 
prices but also of the variability in these prices. We assessed the effect of adjustment 
programmes on the variability of real farm prices by calculating the ratio of instability 
indexes of real farm prices and real border prices. We also attempted to identify the 
contributions to price variability resulting from sectoral (direct) and economy-wide 
(indirect) policies. 
Table 8 shows the ratio of instability indexes for real producer prices to border prices 
for the main agricultural crops for the periods 1970-1978, 1979-1985 and 1990-1943. 
The instability index is calculated as the relative absolute deviation from trend. 6 A ratio 
greater than unity indicates that real domestic producer prices vary at a higher rate than 
do real border prices. Based on this measurement, the results show that price incentiv es 
are more stable for non-cereals than for cereals and that instability increases during the 
NESP period. The wide fluctuations during the NESP period could be attributed mainly 
to the heavy fluctuations in the real exchange rate as a result of the frequent and uneven 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and monetary policies. This, coupled with the 
unstable nature of export marketing in the first few years following the removal of the 
export marketing parastatals, seems to be the main factor contributing to the high 
variability in real farm prices. 
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Table 8: Ratios of Instability Indexes for real producer and real border prices 
C r o p s 1970-78 1979-85 1989-93 
Non-cereals: 
Cotton 
Groundnut 0.98 1.05 0.91 
Sesame 0.86 1.09 1.13 
Gum arabic 0.39 0.11 1.03 
Cereals: 
Sorghum 0.41 2.31 6.85 
Millet 0.98 1.86 5.25 
Wheat 0.38 0.73 2.30 
Sources of instability 
The identification of the source of real farm price instability has important implications 
for the effort to stabilize farm prices. Traditionally, farm price stabilization efforts 
concentrate on direct measures of managing nominal rather than relative producer prices. 
Such stabilization measures may succeed within agriculture but not necessarily between 
agriculture and other sectors of the economy. 
Based on the previous analysis, variability of the policy-induced incentives (NPC p) 
can be decomposed as:7 
War logNPCp = Var(logNPCd + logRER) 
= Var(logNPCJ + Var( logRER) 
+ 2 Cov(!ogNPCir logRER) (9) 
where, Var = variance and Cov=covariance 
The percentage contribution of instabilities in NPC d and RER to variation in NPC p 
can be derived from Equation 9 as: 
Contribution of variability in NPC d = Var(logNPCd)*100/Var(logNPCp) 
Contribution of variability in RER = Var(logRER)*100/Var(NPCp) 
Interaction of NPC d and RER = 2Cov(logNPC d,RER)* J00/Var(NPCp) 
As can be seen from Table 9, the NPC d represents the main source of variability in 
NPC p for the entire period 1970-1993. For the sub-periods (1970-1978, 1979-1985 and 
1990-1993), however, the RER dominates. Table 9 also indicates that during the sub-
periods examined NPC d and RER showed an offsetting movement (negative covariances), 
which acted to reduce instability in real farm prices. The offsetting movement was 
particularly pronounced during the ECRP period, indicating that at the time when sector-
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specific policies (agricultural production and export policies) were acting to push real 
prices up, economy-wide policies worked in the opposite direction. 
Table 9: Decomposition of variance of NPCp, 1970-93 
Period Var Contribution of components to Var (log NPC ) 
(log NPCn) N P ^ RER (NPC„, RER) 
1970-93 0.0230 187 60 -146 
1970-78 0.0052 117 185 -206 
1979-85 0.0273 65 240 -205 
1990-93 0.0265 05 157 -063 
Having thus broadly assessed the effects of the reform programmes on agricultural 
incentives, the rest of the study confines its attention to the examination of the possible 
effect of changes in price incentives on agricultural output, as this is the key to the 
effectiveness of policy reform. 
IV. The aggregate response of agriculture to 
price and non-price incentives 
The central focus of the adjustment reforms in agriculture is to increase agricultural 
production by improving price incentives. Price incentives mean higher returns to farming 
(farm profits) in the short run, which will attract more capital both physical and human 
into agriculture and encourage farmers to adopt new technologies in the long ran. Thus, 
the efficacy of adjustment reforms in agriculture depends on their short run and long run 
effects on economic incentives. The extent to which farm decisions respond to economic 
incentives should, therefore, be of central concern to policy makers. The adjustment 
programmes in Sudan have been implemented with the implicit assumption that individual 
crops as well as aggregate agricultural output are responsive to price changes. There 
seems to be little dispute over the positive response of individual crops, but it is not yet 
clear how aggregate output responds to price changes. 
This study is interested not only in the price effect, but also in the effects of non-price 
factors, such as the impact of infrastructure (roads), research and extension, and 
agricultural credit on aggregate agricultural output. Non-price factors could be grouped 
into two categories: non-policy variables (weather, distance to market, etc.) and policy 
variables-public goods that respond to policy intervention (irrigation, research, market 
structure, etc.). Empirical evidence shows that the two categories are important 
determinants of agricultural output (Evenson, 1988; Binswanger, 1989). Measuring the 
response of agriculture to availability of public goods is important in the analysis of 
adjustment as the delivery of these public goods is expected to decline sharply under the 
thrust of fiscal austerity in the context of adjustment programmes (Mosely and Toye, 
1988; Lipton, 1987). 
Empirical estimates of supply response of individual crops in Sudan have shown 
mixed results. Findings differ in terms of the magnitude of response to prices, but there 
is consensus that individual crops respond positively to price changes (Medani, 1970; 
Ali, 1978; Chhibber and Hrabovszky, 1983;Kabalo, 1984;ElTohamiandBateson, 1986; 
Hag Elamin, 1995). There are a few studies on the impact of prices on aggregate 
agricultural output. Elbadawi (1993) and Hag Elamin (1995) address this issue. The 
results obtained, as in many other developing countries, indicate a positive but generally 
low aggregate response. 
This part of the study attempts to evaluate the response of aggregate agricultural 
output in Sudan. Aggregate output is disaggregated into rainfed and irrigated production, 
on the basis of production mode, and into cereal and non-cereal production, on the basis 
of commodity composition. The distinction between the responses of rainfed agriculture 
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and irrigated agriculture and between cereals and non-cereals has important implications 
for policy reforms. 
Both price and non-price (credit, infrastructure and public investment) determinants 
of agricultural output are considered. Data for the period 1970-1993 are pooled for a 
number of regions in Sudan and a free-form autoregressive distributed lag model is first 
developed to establish a more parsimonious adjustment model based on the Nerlovian 
specification. 
Previous time-series estimates of aggregate 
supply elasticities 
Since the 1960s numerous studies have been carried out on the magnitude and direction 
of farmer response to agricultural prices. The studies have generally focused on the 
estimate of short- and long-run supply price elasticities for individual crops. Positive 
but low short-run price elasticities were reported in almost every case. Long-run price 
elasticities have been found to be higher. For detailed summary of findings, see for 
example, Askari and Cummings (1976), Scandizzo and Bruce (1980), Bond (1983), and 
Beynon (1989). 
The response of aggregate agricultural output is an issue that has recently attracted 
greater attention. Evidence indicates that aggregate agricultural supply response tends 
to be smaller than the response of individual crops. Most of the empirical estimates of 
aggregate agricultural supply response have been largely based on variants of Nerlove's 
(1958) formulation (see, for example, Reca, 1980; Bapna, 1981; Chhibber, 1982; Bond, 
1983). These studies produced broadly similar results with short-run aggregate supply 
elasticities around 0.2 and long-run elasticities of about 0.4. Attempts have been made 
to take into account other factors that affect production decisions such as weather, size of 
farm, credit, etc. 
Supply response studies, however, have been plagued with numerous methodological 
problems and data limitations that limit the reliability of supply elasticity estimates. As 
noted by Binswanger (1989), the common problems related to the aggregate agricultural 
supply response models are the neglect of non-price factors, simultaneity and other 
problems associated with econometric estimation. This study improves data and 
econometric tests and incorporates some important non-price variables into the model in 
its examination of the supply response of aggregate agricultural output in Sudan. 
Model specification 
Among the numerous econometric models estimated for aggregate agricultural supply 
response, there exist two major approaches in modelling time-series supply elasticities. 
The first approach, aggregation of input demand elasticities, is an indirect method of 
estimating aggregate supply elasticity of output by aggregating over the product of the 
elasticity of supply of inputs and the elasticity of demand of inputs (Chhibber, 1989). 
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The second, and most widely adopted approach, is the direct method of using supply 
functions. The problem with the first method is that detailed data on input use and input 
prices are not readily available especially in the developing countries; studies thus 
generally concentrate on the second approach. 
The question arises as to whether the models that have been used by economists to 
analyse agricultural supply response are adequate to capture the complexity of the 
processes involved and derive effective policy recommendations. In these models the 
fundamental determinant of the impact of policy changes on efficiency is the flexibility 
in resource allocation captured in production through price elasticities of supply. 
Price variables 
In order to capture fully the response of agriculture to relative price changes one needs to 
examine the dynamic effects associated with changes in relative prices. This may need 
a more comprehensive macroeconomic framework that integrates the domestic price 
structure, production patterns and income distribution (Mundlak et al., 1988). Lack of 
comprehensive relevant data precludes the development of such a model for Sudan. The 
alternative approach is to use a single equation dynamic model that allows for the estimate 
of long-run response of output. Most of the models used in this respect are based on the 
Nerlovian specification, which postulates desired output as a function of expected output 
prices as follows: 
Where Q e is the desired output, P is expected price and Z is a shift variable. But 
neither desired output nor expected price are observable. In order to overcome this 
problem, Nerlove (1958) introduced a price expectation specification and an adjustment 
mechanism: 
Where expected price, P , is explained as the sum of past expected price (P e t l) plus a 
fraction C of the difference between last period's actual and expected prices. C is the 
coefficient of price expectation. Equation 12 indicates that actual output (Q t) adjusts by 
some fraction (B) of the difference between the desired output and actual output of the 
previous period. Like C, B is constant and is referred to as the Nerlovian coefficient of 
adjustment. 
By imposing a restriction that C=1 and substituting Equations 11 and 12 into Equation 
10, a reduced form equation is derived as: 
Qe = a + a,Pe + aZ+ U o 1 2 (10) 
F, = P"(/ + C[PirP'n]0<C<l 
Q, = Q,_j + B[Qet - Qt l] 0<B<1 
(11) 
(12) 
Qt = bo + b,Pt_, + b2Qrl + bsZ, + U, (13) 
where: 
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b = Bao 
= Ba° 
B 2 
= 1-B 
b3 = a2(l-B) 
The diversity and inconsistency of empirical findings of agricultural response using 
the Nerlovian specification, as in Equation 13, cast doubts on its appropriateness to capture 
fully the dynamics of agricultural supply (Rao, 1989; Binswanger, 1989). Criticisms of 
the model results, however, tend to be of an econometric rather than theoretical nature. 
Inaccurate and/or short time-series data and the neglect of important non-price variables 
are among the major problems facing supply response estimates in general and estimates 
of aggregate supply response in particular. 
Non-price variables 
While Equation 13 depicts the theoretical description of the adjustment model, its final 
form of empirical estimation must capture the revelant factors underlying agricultural 
supply. Agricultural supply represents the response of farmers to changes in farm profits. 
Changes in farm profits, however, are the result of the interplay in changes in prices, 
infrastructure, agricultural credit, technology, etc. Available empirical findings tend to 
suggest that the association between real farm prices and agricultural output in Sudan is 
weak, which implies the importance of non-price factors in determining farm output. 
The specification of the supply response should, therefore, consider these non-price 
variables. Non-price factors are found to be significant determinants of crop responses 
and aggregate output in many developing countries (see, for example, Delgado et al., 
1987; Binswanger, 1989). Introducing measures for infrastructure, credit and public 
investment in agriculture, Equation 13 could be rewritten as: 
Q, = bo + b,Phl + b2Qtl + bJRl + bf + b f R + b6V + bpUM + £/ 
where: 
Q, = aggregate agricultural output at time t 
P = real farm gate price 
R = average rainfall index 
F = infrastructure (taken as the ratio of paved to unpaved roads) 
CR = , agricultural credit per feddan 
V = public investment (investment/unit cropped area) 
DUM = dummy variable for weather hazards 
U = error term 
(14) 
The dummy variable, DUM, is intended to capture the effects of the unusual 
environmental hazards of drought (1983/84) and floods (1988/89), where considerable 
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drops in production occurred. The introduction of such a dummy may look repetitive 
because a measure of weather (rainfall) is already incorporated into the model. Rainfall 
index per se may not account for the effects of the unusual weather changes, however. 
The effect of excessive rainfall may be similar to that of little or no rainfall, which 
cannot be captured by the rainfall index. 
This version of the model can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) if the 
original Uts are not serially correlated. Pre-tests of the model showed that, in terms of 
statistical fit of the data, the double-log transformation was superior to the linear and 
semi-log models. The supply response function (Equation 14), is therefore estimated in 
a logarithmic form, which allows interpretation of coefficients as elasticities. Positive 
parameters are expected for all explanatory variables. The short- and long-run price 
elasticities can be derived from the log form of Equation (14) as b" t and b'/( 1 -b"2) 
respectively. 
Data: Definitions and characteristics 
Estimation of aggregate supply elasticities, using time-series data, complicate the 
construction of index for aggregate output, prices and other supply factors. The aggregate 
output, Q, is measured on the basis of produced quantities rather than cropped areas, the 
aggregation of which has little meaning from the economic standpoint. Aggregate output 
is then calculated as a weighted average of the production index of individual crops, the 
weights being the share of each crop in the total value of agricultural output. 8 
The price variable, P, the indicator of price incentives for producers, is a measure of 
relative prices. Clearly, relative prices rather than absolute prices are likely to affect 
profitability. The numeraire of relative farm prices could be taken as prices of inputs, 
prices of consumer goods or prices of other competing crops.9 Prices of agricultural 
inputs or manufactured goods may not be a good indicator as these goods were mostly 
rationed especially during the 1970s. Analysis of supply response based on prices of 
rationed goods is not very meaningful (Berthelemey and Morrison, 1987). This, in addition 
to the fact that the study emphasizes the examination of aggregate response of agriculture, 
suggests that it is more relevant here to define real prices as the aggregate prices of 
agricultural goods relative to the aggregate prices of non-agricultural goods. Given paucity 
of time-series data on non-agricultural goods prices, the consumer price index (CPI) is 
taken as a proxy. 1 0 
The real aggregate farm-gate price is calculated as a weighted average of the farm-
gate price indexes of the major agricultural crops in Sudan. An index of the ratio of 
paved to unpaved roads is specified as a proxy for infrastructure. Agricultural credit is 
estimated as the average credit per unit of cropped area. Rainfall is taken as the average 
annual rainfall index. 
Time-series data covering the period between 1971/72 and 1992/93 were used. Data 
on agricultural output, farm-gate prices and rainfall were obtained from the Department 
of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan. Data on 
agricultural credit, infrastructure and public investment in agriculture were obtained from 
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the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Gezira scheme, and the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan. In order to improve the degree of freedom for the estimates, a cross 
section time series is used, where, on the basis of the data available, Sudan is divided 
into four agricultural regions. These include the irrigated subsector (Gezira, Rahad and 
New Haifa schemes), the mechanized subsector (Gedarif and Damazin areas), Kordol'an 
Region and Darfur Region. 
Two important defects of the data need to be mentioned. First, due to lack of data, the 
southern part of the country is excluded. Second, and for the same reason, some fond 
crops, mainly horticultural crops that are produced almost entirely for domestic 
consumption, were not considered. The exclusion of such minor domestic goods, however, 
may serve to minimize the possibility of simultaneity in the model. When the prices ol' 
non-tradeable goods, such as horticultural crops in the case of Sudan, increase and supply 
expands, prices may fall again as domestic demand may not be responsive enough to 
absorb the excess supply. 
Testing for stationarity of the series 
The Nerlovian adjustment model is based on strong theoretical and economic grounds, 
but the dynamic interactions of agricultural response are thought to be too complex to be 
fully captured by theoretically based constructs. Generally, if the variables included in 
the model are non-stationary," then the partial adjustment coefficient will generally fail 
to capture the structural characteristics of the model. Data admissibility considerations 
are, therefore, important determinants of the short-run dynamics of models (Adam, 1992). 
Recent developments in econometrics have introduced some techniques and tests of the 
short-time dynamics of models. Equation 14 is therefore used as the core conditional 
model around which a more parsimonious econometric representation is sought by 
examining the short-run dynamics of the model. 
On the estimation procedures, we draw on recent developments in examination of 
time-series characteristics of data. To test for the stationarity characteristics of the data, 
the order of integration (unit root) tests were conducted for each of the variables. The 
tests used were Dickey-Fuller (DF), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Sargan-
Bhargava Durbin-Watson (SBDW). 1 2 PC-GIVE (Hendry, 1989) software was used to 
calculate the data in Table B1 in Appendix B, which reports the results of these tests for 
each series. All the tests strongly accept 1(0), which can be interpreted as indicating that 
all variables are stationary. This suggests that spurious regression is less likely to be 
encountered in the application of a dynamic specification such as in Equation 14. 
Estimation results 
In order to identify the main dynamic patterns of the model an over-parameterized 
autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL) is first developed, using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), with a three-lag length for all variables in the model. The regression results 
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(from PC-GIVE) for the ADL version of Equation 14 are reported in Appendix B (Table 
132). 
The model is further simplified into a more interpretable Nerlovian adjustment variant. 
The simplification is guided by data admissibility with the main concern that the model 
remains theory consistent. Dropping the lagged insignificant variables led to improved 
(-ratios for the remaining regressors. Furthermore, to eliminate cross regional (district) 
variability, due to possible correlation between explanatory variables with unobserved 
district endowments, district-specific intercepts were included. This served to improve 
predicted values relative to actual values. 
The most interesting result of the ADL model is that current price does not seem to 
have significant impact on current output. This is not surprising, as only a few crops, 
mainly wheat, have their prices set before planning and farmers therefore have to form 
their expectations on the basis of past prices, as appears to be supported by the ADL 
results. Lagged rather than current public investment appears to be important in 
determining current output. 
The final model produced by the simplification process is reported in Table 10. This 
model performed better than did the ADL. The simplification resulted in an improvement 
in the Schwartz information criterion (SC) compared with the ADL model. The Durbin 
h-statistic indicates no serious serial correlation in the error term. Overall, the model is 
considered to be reasonably specified based on its statistical significance and its ability 
to track historical records. All the estimated coefficients, except infrastructure, are of 
the expected sign. 
The coefficients for lagged real price, rainfall, credit and lagged public investment 
are positive and significant at least at the 5% significance level. Surprisingly, infrastructure 
does not have the expected sign and is significant at the 15% level of significance. This 
may be the result of inappropriate specification of this variable due to the poor data base. 
Infrastructure is therefore dropped from the model. 
The results indicate that the aggregate supply response to three of the non-price factors 
included in the model (rainfall, credit and public investment) is positive and significant. 
The coefficient for rainfall, which is significant at the 1 % level, suggests that rainfall is 
an important factor determining aggregate agricultural output in Sudan. The positive 
elasticities for credit and public investment, which are highly significant at the 1% level, 
are theoretically plausible as credit and public investment represent additional resources 
for agriculture that promote its overall growth. Improvement in credit and public 
investment in agriculture will promote the implementation of new and more productive 
techniques that are capital intensive (McGuirk and Mundlak, 1992). 
The estimated supply price elasticity (0.24) indicates that the response of Sudanese 
agriculture, as in other SSA countries, is rather restricted. Using FAO data for nine 
African countries and taking the per capita agricultural output as an expression of total 
agricultural production, Bond (1983) obtained an average aggregate supply price elasticity 
of 0.12. This average is a bit smaller than our estimate of 0.24. 
Low price elasticity of aggregate agricultural supply could be attributed to a host of 
constraints to which Sudanese agriculture is particularly prone. The dominance of the 
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rainfed agriculture with hazardous weather and frequent incidence of pest and diseases, 
acute shortage of seasonal labour, and inadequate rural infrastructure are among the 
major factors that hinder the growth of agriculture in Sudan. There is a severe shortage 
of labour during certain critical agricultural operations, especially harvesting (El Bashir, 
1984). 
Table 10: Modell ing aggregate agricultural output (in Q) by OLS pooled t ime series/cross 
section data for four regions for the period 1971/72-1992/93 
Variable Coefficient Std Error HCSE1 t-Value Partial r2 
In Qt-1 .410 .080 .075 5.15 .26 
In Pt-1 .240 .107 .118 2.22 .06 
In R .570 .187 .233 3.05 .11 
In CR .160 .066 .092 2.50 .08 
In Vt-1 .240 .107 .090 2.25 .06 
DUMw -.460 .084 .093 -5.41 .28 
DUM1 -.004 .101 .076 -.04 .00 
DUM2 .192 .104 .091 1.86 .04 
DUM3 -.149 .100 .081 -1.48 .03 
CONSTANT -2.147 1.228 1.549 -1.75 .04 
R2 = .69 0 = .2786406 F( 9,77) = 16.84 DW = 1.836 SC2 =-2.164445 
HCSE = heteroscedastic consistent standard error 
SC (Schwarz information criterion) provides a guide and parsimonious information reduction so that a fall in 
SC is an indication of parsimony.) 
Q = aggregate agricultural output 
P = real farm-gate price 
R = average rainfall index 
CR = agricultural credit per feddan 
V = public investment (investment/unit cropped area) 
DUMw = dummy variable for weather hazards 
DUM1, DUM2 and DUM3 = intercept dummies for regions 
In = natural logarithm 
Disaggregation of agricultural output 
Supply elasticities for the aggregate rainfed, irrigated, cereal and non-cereal production 
were estimated using the same core model (Equation 14) and following the same 
estimation procedure. The short-run price responsiveness of agriculture is expected to 
increase with further product disaggregation. Shifting resources between agricultural 
and non-agricultural production is more difficult than shifting them between activities 
within agriculture. The disaggregation of agricultural production could be considered at 
different levels, but the one of immediate concern to policy-makers is the disaggregation 
on the basis of mode of production, rainfed versus irrigated, or on the basis of commodity 
composition, cereals versus non-cereals. The distinction between food crops and export 
crops in Sudan may not be meaningful, since food crops (e.g., oil seeds) are often potent 
exports. Decomposition of agricultural output into cereals and non-cereals may give a 
better indicator of the food/cash crop mix. 
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Table 11: Modell ing aggregate rainfed production (In Q) by OLS pooled t ime series/cross 
section data for three regions for the period 1971/72-1992/93 
Variable Coefficient Std Error HCSE t-Value Partial r2 
In Qt-1 .424 .097 .088 4.38 .25 
In Pt-1 .226 .136 .151 1.67 .05 
In R .570 .221 .252 2.58 .11 
In CR .181 .087 .125 2.08 .07 
In Vt-1 .201 .130 .107 1.55 .04 
DUMw -.474 .099 .097 -4.81 .29 
DUM1 .189 .120 .096 1.57 .04 
DUM2 -.146 .115 .084 -1.28 .03 
CONSTANT -2.149 1.464 1.764 -1.47 .04 
R2 = .69 a = .3102992 F( 8,57) = 13.79 DW = 1.833 SC =-1.915723. 
HCSE = heteroscedastic consistent standard error 
SC (Schwarz information criterion) provides a guide and parsimonious information reduction such that a fall 
in SC is an indication of parsimony.) 
Q = aggregate agricultural output 
p = real farm-gate price 
R = average rainfall index 
CR = agricultural credit per feddan 
V = public investment (investment/unit cropped area) 
DUMW = dummy variable for weather hazards 
DUM1, DUM2 and DUM3 = intercept dummies for regions 
Equation 14 is estimated for the aggregate outputs of rainfed agriculture, irrigated 
agriculture, cereals and non-cereals. The function was estimated in a similar fashion to 
the aggregate supply function, where an ADL model is first developed from which a 
more reasonably parsimonious model is derived. Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 contain the 
estimated regression coefficients. The overall fit of each of the estimated functions is 
quite satisfactory; the estimated coefficients of the lagged price are positive and significant, 
at least, at the 5% level of significance. The estimated short- and long-run supply price 
elasticities for the aggregate agricultural output, and the aggregate output of cereals, 
noncereals, rainfed and irrigated sectors are summarized in Table 15. As expected, the 
short-run price elasticities of aggregate output are low compared with other disaggregated 
levels. While this is to be expected, the difference is markedly low. 
The disaggregated supply functions yield some interesting results. First, contrary to 
expectation, the state-managed irrigated agriculture is more responsive to prices, in the 
short run, than the privately-managed rainfed agriculture. Natural hazards and 
infrastructural constraints are more prevalent in the rainfed areas than in the irrigated 
areas. This, coupled with the fact that a large proportion of the rainfed production is for 
subsistence purposes, may explain the low response of rainfed agriculture. 
In the long run, however, the response of rainfed agriculture is markedly high. This 
discrepancy in long run response indicates that potential growth in output is higher in 
rainfed than in irrigated agriculture. This is plausible as the acreage expansion and the 
marginal returns on additional investment in technology are expected to be higher in 
rainfed agriculture. 
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Second, the disaggregation of agriculture on commodity basis (cereal/non-cereals) 
yields higher elasticities than that on mode of production. This is plausible as resources 
could more easily be allocated between cereal and non-cereal crops than between rainfed 
and irrigated sectors. Paradoxically, cereals output, which is mainly for domestic 
consumption, is more responsive to prices than is non-cereal cash output. 
Table 12: Modelling aggregate irrigated production (in Q) by OLS pooled time series data 
for one region (Gezira) for the period 1971/72-1992/93 
Variable Coefficient Std Error HCSE t-Value Partial r2 
In Qt-1 .04 .149 .158 .24 .00 
In Pt-1 .29 .138 .135 2.09 .24 
In CR .21 .060 .073 3.61 .48 
In Vt-1 .47 .129 .098 3.64 .49 
In F -.77 .299 .358 -2.58 .32 
DUMw -.46 .120 .038 -3.83 .51 
CONSTANT 4.76 1.366 1.459 3.48 .46 
R2 = .86 a = .1145209 F( 6,14) = 13.60 DW = 1.554 SC = -3.724620 
Table 13: Modelling aggregate cereals output (in Q) by OLS pooled time series/cross 
section data for four regions for the period 1971/72-1992/93 
Variable Coefficient Std Error HCSE t-Value Partial r2 
In Qt-1 .290 .108 .092 2.66 .11 
In Pt-1 .454 .140 .147 3.24 .16 
In R .244 .229 .211 1.07 .02 
In CR .287 .087 .088 3.31 .16 
In Vt-1 .489 .166 .170 2.95 .13 
DUMw -.794 .196 .264 -4.06 .23 
DUM1 .325 .124 .114 2.62 .11 
DUM2 -.0301 .114 .115 -.26 .00 
CONSTANT -2.287 1.449 1.511 -1.58 .04 
R2 = .70 a =.3536085 F( 8,56) = 11.57 DW = 1.697 SC = -1.650173 
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Table 14: Modelling aggregate non-cereals output (in Q) by OLS pooled time series/cross 
section data for four regions for the period 1971/72-1992/93 
Variable Coefficient Std Error HCSE t-Value Partial r2 
In Qt-1 .298 .219 .269 1.36 .11 
In Pt-1 .338 .212 .195 1.59 .15 
In F -.620 .233 .237 -2.66 .32 
In Vt-1 .889 .326 .372 2.73 .33 
In CR -.260 .129 .179 -2.01 .21 
DUMw -.026 .281 .481 -.09 .00 
CONSTANT 3.954 1.568 1.784 2.52 .34 
R2 = .79 a = .2913328 F( 8,56) = 9.15 DW = 1.825 SC = -1.866057 
Table 15: Agricultural supply price elasticities 
Adjustment Short-run Long-run 
coefficient elasticity elasticity 
Aggregate output 0.59 0.24 0.41 
Disaggregation on the basis 
of mode of production: 
-rainfed agriculture 0.58 0.23 0.40 
-irrigated agriculture 0.97 0.29 0.30 
Disaggregation on the basis 
of commodity composition: 
-cereals 0.71 0.45 0.63 
-non-cereals 0.70 0.34 0.49 
Long-run elasticity = (short-run elasticity)/(1 - adjustment coefficient) 
V. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study investigated the influence of structural adjustment programmes on price 
incentives for agricultural production in Sudan. The examination shows that the two 
main programmes implemented in Sudan over the period 1978-1993 (ECRP and NESP) 
failed to improve either the level or the stability of real farm prices. Partial implementation 
of programmes and weak macroeconomic policies constitute the underlying causes. 
International terms of trade aggravated the bias against agriculture during the NESP 
(1990-1993). The findings indicate that the real exchange rate is an important determinant 
of agricultural price incentives. The economy-wide policies (exchange rate, trade and 
macroeconomic policies) form a dominant source of tax on agriculture. If agriculture is 
to contribute to Sudan's economic recovery and long-term growth, not only do the sector-
specific policies need to be improved, but also - and mainly - the trade and macroeconomic 
environment determining the real exchange rate must be enhanced. 
Analysis of agricultural supply response indicates that the supply price elasticity of 
aggregate agricultural output in Sudan, as in other developing countries, is positive but 
low. This adds to the accumulating evidence of the positive response of developing 
countries' agriculture sectors to price incentives. This evidence suggests that the target 
of the adjustment programmes in Sudan (ECRP and NESP) of raising producer prices is 
reasonable and advisable, although evidence shows the failure of both programmes to 
produce any significant increase in real farm prices. But more seriously, the two 
programmes seem to have underplayed the role of the non-price factors, though the 
NESP has an edge in this respect. Non-price factors appear to play an important role in 
determining agricultural growth. The importance of the non-price factors arises from 
their direct effects on the magnitude of farmers' response to price incentives. 
The analysis implies that without the provision of adequate credit, infrastructure and 
public investment, aggregate agricultural supply response to increased price incentives 
will be minimal. Agricultural price policy measures must be implemented carefully, 
complemented by suitable macroeconomic policies and much needed non-price policies. 
Three important implications may be drawn from the aggregate supply elasticities. 
First, aggregate output responds positively to output prices, but negatively to reduction 
in public inputs. Raising farm prices and improving the provision of public inputs arc 
difficult to achieve simultaneously, however. The government's high fiscal dependence 
on agriculture suggests that raising agricultural prices may reduce government's capacity 
to finance public goods in the short run. The net effect of such a policy on agricultural 
output may well be negative. Given the fiscal constraint that usually faces the government 
during adjustment programmes, it would be extremely difficult to avoid the short-run 
negative impact of reduced public inputs. Supply price elasticity alone does not reflect 
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fully the likely effect of changes in real farm prices following adjustment reforms. The 
actual outcome in the short run is the net composite effect of changes in real farm prices 
and the consequent change in the provision of public goods in agriculture emanating 
from changes in real farm prices. 
It is theoretically plausible that higher prices may serve in the long run to promote 
private investments in research, technology and public goods. At the present level of 
development in the country, however, it is less likely that the private sector will be able 
to invest significantly in response to higher prices. 
Second, the aggregate response of cereals (staple food crops) to price changes seems 
to be positive and much higher than expected. This finding does not lend support to the 
generally held notion that an increase in the general price level for agriculture increases 
cash crop production at the expense of food production. Cereal crops in Sudan are not 
produced entirely for domestic purposes. The distinction between food and cash crops is 
perhaps inaccurate for Sudan, as increasingly cereals and non-cereals provide alternative 
sources of cash income for the farmer. 
Third, while the adjustment reforms seem to have paid more attention to increasing 
incentives to producers, some of the measures adopted (as part of these reforms) actually 
worked to reduce farmers' response to incentives. The tight control on consumer goods 
imports and the removal of subsidies from consumer goods, for instance, have resulted 
in shortages of basic commodities such as fuel, tea, sugar and clothing. Shortages of 
these commodities undermine farmers' response to price incentives. Acute shortages of 
imported foods in the semi-arid region where tribesmen tap the gum trees have resulted 
in a sharp decline in gum arabic production (Nashashibi, 1980). Recent studies on SSA 
have shown the significant impact of consumer goods availability on cash crop expansion 
(Berthlemey and Morrison, 1987; Bevan, et al., 1987). These problems appear to be 
more acute in rainfed agriculture. Furthermore, adjustment programmes, through their 
short-term effects on price stability and supply of imported inputs, tend to create a 
significant element of risk and uncertainty, which may reduce farmer's response to prices. 
The rate of adoption and diffusion of production technologies in Sudanese agriculture, 
for example, was shown to depend a great deal on the associated risks (Hassan, D'Silva 
and Hallam, 1992). 
The findings of this study hold some important implications for policy making in 
Sudanese agriculture. The current three-year economic programme (1994-1996) 
liberalized large sectors of the Sudanese economy from public sector control and attempted 
to promote the role of the private sector. Significant developments have taken place in 
this respect: farmers' representation in the boards of directors of APCs increased to 50%; 
all decisions on credit and financing are negotiated by farmers; and cotton marketing is 
completely controlled by the Farmers' Union, which owns the Cotton Marketing Company 
since its privatization. It is too early to judge on the impact of such changes in agriculture. 
But the findings of the study call for special attention to the need for a more balanced 
policy change that gives due consideration to public investment in agriculture. At this 
level of development in the country, growth in agriculture can hardly be achieved without 
public investments. 
It is hoped that further improvements in data quality and methodology may help in 
producing a more accurate vision of the way agriculture responds to policy changes. 
Notes 
1. Some of the previous studies on the supply response of Sudanese agriculture are 
cited in Section 4 of this study. 
2. Estimates of livestock population vary widely according to source. Recent official 
estimates go as high as 103 million. The facts will have to be revealed by the livestock 
census, which is long overdue. 
3. During the 1980s remittances constituted an important source of foreign exchange 
earnings in Sudan. For instance, in 1986 remittances represented 67% of the country's 
total value of merchandise exports (FAO, 1990). 
4. The use of border price equivalents (adjusted for transportation and marketing costs) 
means that the NPC d for exportables and importables can be expressed as: 
NPC d = Pf/(EPb-c) for exportables 
and NPC d = Pf/(EPb+c) for importables 
where c is the marketing and transportation costs from the farm gate to the border 
and EPb is the border price before adjustment for transportation and marketing costs. 
In other words, EPb* is equivalent to EPb-c for exportables and to EPb+c for 
importables. 
5. Terms-of-trade effects were automatically excluded as only NRP d and NRP p are used. 
6. The instability index is specified as: 
1=Z(IX-X*I)/X* 
Where the sign II indicates absolute value 
X = actual producer/border price 
X* = linear trend of producer/border price 
7. This method was previously used for isolating the contributions of price and quantity 
effects to revenue instability (Murray, 1979; Wiebelt et al., 1992). 
8. Aggregate agricultural output is specified as: 
Q„ = ivv, Q i t 
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where: 
Q x = aggregate output 
Wu = share of the ith crop in total value of agricultural output in year t 
Q.t = output index (1980=100) of crop i in year t 
Aggregate farm-gate prices were estimated applying the same formula. 
9. For the appropriate use of each of these prices, see, for example, Askari and Cummings 
(1976). 
10. The GDP deflator is a better proxy than CPI, but incomplete data preclude its use. 
11. Non-stationary series have a variance that is asymptotically infinite and the series 
rarely crosses its mean. In contrast, stationary series have a finite variance with a 
tendency to return to the mean value. 
12. The DF and ADF are tests against the null that there is a unit root 1(1) of the series 
(see Dickey and Fuller, 1981;Adam, 1992). The SBDW is a test against the null that 
the series is stationary [1(0)]. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Nominal protection coefficients NPC, (Pf/Pb*) for the major agricultural 
commodities, 1970-1993 
Sorghum Wheat GN Gum Millet Sesame Cotton Aggregate Cereals Non-Cer. 
1970 0.76 1.13 0.63 0.67 0.92 0.59 0.00 0.79 0.80 0.62 
1971 0.49 1.00 0.46 0.67 0.39 0.72 0.00 0.53 0.52 0.57 
1972 0.34 1.06 0.51 0.32 0.68 0.71 0.00 0.45 0.42 0.56 
1973 0.38 1.20 0.46 0.31 1.29 0.42 0.00 0.52 0.53 0.44 
1974 0.42 1.02 0.69 0.63 1.48 0.54 0.00 0.58 0.56 0.64 
1975 0.31 1.81 0.94 1.32 0.72 0.73 0.00 0.52 0.45 0.90 
1976 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.72 0.85 0.79 0.00 0.52 0.50 0.63 
1977 0.67 1.33 0.53 0.56 0.91 0.44 0.00 0.72 0.74 0.50 
1978 0.73 1.23 0.43 0.44 0.95 0.57 0.00 0.76 0.79 0.48 
1979 0.52 0.79 0.43 0.52 2.62 0.48 0.00 0.71 0.74 0.46 
1980 0.41 0.87 0.55 0.30 1.75 0.68 0.00 0.58 0.57 0.57 
1981 0.51 1.27 0.48 0.28 2.76 1.09 0.88 0.80 0.78 0.81 
1982 0.47 1.24 0.61 0.44 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.66 0.57 0.84 
1983 0.95 0.91 0.44 0.42 0.97 0.81 0.69 0.87 0.95 0.65 
1984 0.90 1.16 0.52 0.74 1.04 0.97 0.65 0.87 0.93 0.68 
1985 1.96 1.51 0.55 0.52 1.41 0.40 0.46 1.49 1.88 0.48 
1986 1.04 1.14 0.63 0.43 0.96 1.01 0.93 1.00 1.04 0.86 
1987 0.55 2.29 0.89 0.67 1.01 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.72 0.86 
1988 1.44 0.91 1.09 0.82 1.23 0.83 0.74 1.23 1.38 0.83 
1989 0.94 2.57 0.54 0.77 1.09 1.50 0.86 1.02 1.07 0.88 
1990 1.16 1.27 0.97 0.80 1.56 0.58 0.99 1.14 1.23 0.93 
1991 1.91 0.88 1.01 0.78 2.40 0.54 0.76 1.28 1.50 0.78 
1992 0.87 1.03 0.66 0.73 1.45 0.97 0.51 0.87 0.97 0.63 
1993 0.98 0.60 0.35 0.50 1.79 0.94 0.26 0.73 0.86 0.41 
Source: Computations are based on data obtained from the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture; and Bank of Sudan Annual Report (various issues). 
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Table A2: Terms of trade TOT (Pb*/P*) for the major agricultural commodities, 1970-1993 
Sorghum Wheat GN Gum Millet Sesame Cotton Aggr. Cereals Non-
cer. 
1970 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LS 
1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 
1971 0.96 1.15 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.74 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.93 
1972 0.92 1.04 0.93 2.04 0.93 0.78 1.02 0.96 0.93 1.01 
1973 0.83 0.91 1.01 1.97 0.79 1.35 1.20 0.95 0.83 1.21 
1974 1.20 1.49 1.32 1.50 0.85 1.23 1.62 1.29 1.19 1.50 
1975 2.00 0.78 0.80 1.24 0.78 1.21 1.27 1.63 1.79 1.17 
1976 0.88 2.30 1.10 1.22 0.81 0.95 1.25 1.04 0.97 1.18 
1977 0.75 0.90 1.30 1.41 0.67 0.84 1.54 0.94 0.75 1.39 
1978 0.82 0.91 1.23 1.16 0.60 1.01 1.14 0.91 0.80 1.15 
1979 0.98 1.18 1.22 1.15 0.37 1.19 1.18 1.02 0.93 1.19 
1980 0.65 0.73 0.53 1.95 0.31 0.61 1.31 0.76 0.62 1.08 
1981 0.89 0.65 1.00 2.41 0.33 0.45 1.26 0.92 0.81 1.14 
1982 0.83 0.59 0.46 1.70 0.92 0.52 1.42 0.92 0.82 1.11 
1983 0.79 0.92 1.09 2.23 0.75 0.83 1.83 1.02 0.80 1.56 
1984 0.84 0.90 1.34 2.09 0.91 0.89 2.26 1.16 0.85 1.88 
1985 0.51 0.50 0.98 3.59 0.82 2.08 1.90 0.91 0.54 1.80 
1986 0.72 0.95 1.39 2.49 1.01 0.82 0.96 0.86 0.76 1.09 
1987 0.39 0.28 0.45 2.97 0.35 0.47 0.72 0.48 0.38 0.71 
1988 0.33 0.80 0.36 1.70 0.44 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.37 0.54 
1989 0.25 0.24 0.48 1.26 0.23 0.32 0.44 0.31 0.25 0.46 
1990 0.31 0.58 0.62 0.95 0.26 1.01 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.62 
1991 0.36 0.78 0.64 0.97 0.32 0.83 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.64 
1992 0.34 0.48 0.88 1.12 0.31 0.66 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.73 
1993 0.26 0.44 0.86 0.53 0.20 0.36 0.46 0.40 0.34 0.52 
Source: Computations are based on data obtained from the Bank of Sudan Annual Report (various issues) 
and the IMF, IFS (1980, 1990, 1994). 
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Table A3: Real exchange rate index RER (EP7P) for the major agricultural commodities, 
1970-1993 
RER for cotton 
and gum 
RER for other 
crops 
Aggregate RER 
1970 0.99 0.99 0.99 
1971 1.05 1.05 1.05 
1972 0.95 0.95 0.95 
1973 0.89 0.89 0.89 
1974 0.80 0.80 0.80 
1975 0.72 0.72 0.72 
1976 0.77 0.77 0.77 
1977 0.71 0.71 0.71 
1978 0.92 0.69 0.74 
1979 0.77 0.65 0.67 
1980 0.68 0.68 0.68 
1981 0.61 0.65 0.64 
1982 0.52 1.35 1.18 
1983 0.42 1.09 0.95 
1984 0.33 0.85 0.74 
1985 0.23 1.17 0.98 
1986 0.58 0.86 0.81 
1987 0.67 1.14 0.04 
1988 0.93 0.93 0.93 
1989 0.84 0.58 0.63 
1990 0.70 0.37 0.43 
1991 0.33 0.21 0.23 
1992 0.58 0.96 0.88 
1993 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Source: Computations are based on data obtained from the Bank of Sudan Annual Report (various issues) 
and the IMF, IFS (1980, 1990, 1994). 
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Table A4: Nominal aggregate agriculture protection rates, 1978-1993 
NRPh NRP„ NRP, 
1970 -21.37 -21.77 -20.99 
1971 -46.80 -44.23 -46.09 
1972 -55.40 -57.67 -59.42 
1973 -47.65 -53.46 -55.85 
1974 -42.17 -53.82 -40.47 
1975 -48.34 -62.69 -39.21 
1976 -47.54 -59.67 -58.07 
1977 -28.30 -49.06 -52.00 
1978 -24.32 -44.10 -49.22 
Average (70-78) -40.21 -49.61 -46.81 
1979 -28.87 -52.06 -51.28 
1980 -41.74 -60.15 -69.66 
1981 -20.01 -48.77 -53.05 
1982 -34.21 -22.25 -28.84 
1983 -12.73 -16.91 -14.88 
1984 -13.22 -35.50 -25.34 
1985 49.07 46.26 32.68 
Average (79-85) -41.53 -27.06 -30.05 
1986 -0.29 -19.54 -30.52 
1987 -23.45 -20.21 -62.09 
1988 23.33 14.80 -51.22 
1989 2.45 -35.21 -79.78 
1990 14.26 -50.31 -75.70 
1991 28.36 -70.29 -82.97 
1992 -13.07 -27.54 -63.47 
1993 -27.44 -25.99 -70.39 
Average (90-93) 0.53 -43.53 -73.13 
Source: Computed from tables A1-A3 using the formulas of equations 4-6, where the total value of 
agriculture is taken as the total value of the selected crops. 
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Table A5: Nominal cereals protection rates, 1970-1993 
N R P D N R P P N R P , 
1970 -20.06 -20.46 -20.54 
1971 -48.24 -45.74 -47.38 
1972 -57.87 -60.02 -63.01 
1973 -47.14 -53.01 -61.02 
1974 -43.92 -55.22 -46.91 
1975 -54.96 -67.47 -41.67 
1976 -49.88 -61.47 -62.73 
1977 -26.13 -47.51 -60.73 
1978 -21.32 -45.49 -56.34 
Average (70-78) -41.06 -50.71 -51.15 
1979 -26.12 -51.90 -55.11 
1980 -42.53 -60.69 -75.46 
1981 -21.64 -49.15 -58.60 
1982 -42.64 -22.70 -36.30 
1983 -5.01 3.13 -17.88 
1984 -6.71 -20.93 -32.75 
1985 87.77 119.32 17.85 
Average (79-85) -8.13 -11.85 -36.89 
1986 3.76 -10.29 -31.66 
1987 -28.42 -18.73 -69.52 
1988 37.92 28.38 -51.97 
1989 6.72 -38.02 -84.58 
1990 23.13 -54.53 -80.59 
1991 49.95 -68.83 -83.09 
1992 -3.02 -12.14 -64.79 
1993 -13.98 -12.25 -70.32 
Average (90-93) 14.02 -36.94 -74.70 
Source: Computed from tables A1-A3 using the formulas of equations 4-6, where the total value of cereals 
is taken as the total value of the selected cereal crops (wheat, sorghum and millet). 
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Table A6: Nominal non-cereal crops protection rates, 1970-1993 
N R P R I N R P O N R P , 
1970 -37.73 -38.04 -37.82 
1971 -42.74 -39.98 -44.40 
1972 -43.78 -46.64 -46.08 
1973 -56.37 -61.22 -52.88 
1974 -36.41 -49.22 -23.64 
1975 -10.12 -35.08 -24.19 
1976 -37.43 -51.90 -43.02 
1977 -49.72 -64.28 -50.17 
1978 -51.59 -64.24 -59.01 
Average (70-78) -40.65 -50.07 -42.36 
1979 -54.17 -69.11 -63.25 
1980 -42.51 -60.67 -57.65 
1981 -18.86 -48.04 -40.64 
1982 -15.51 -0.15 10.90 
1983 -34.94 -38.06 -3.47 
1984 -32.41 -49.77 -5.38 
1985 -52.35 -53.25 -15.93 
Average (79-85) -35.82 -45.58 -25.06 
1986 -13.80 -30.44 -24.18 
1987 -13.76 -10.11 -36.22 
1988 -17.02 -22.76 -58.52 
1989 -11.84 -44.25 -74.34 
1990 -7.16 -59.62 -74.82 
1991 -22.38 -82.04 -88.58 
1992 -37.24 -47.69 -61.59 
1993 -59.27 -58.45 -77.72 
Average (90-93) -31.51 -61.95 -75.68 
Source: Computed from tables A1-A3 using the formulas of equations 4-6, where the total value of non-
cereals is taken as the total value of the selected non-cereal crops. 
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